379 US 642 Arrow Transportation Co v. Cincinnati New Orleans & Texas Pac R Co Interstate Commerce Comm'N

379 U.S. 642

85 S.Ct. 610

13 L.Ed.2d 550

ARROW TRANSPORTATION CO. et al.
v.
The CINCINNATI, NEW ORLEANS & TEXAS PAC. R. CO. et al. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMM'N v. The CINCINNATI, NEW ORLEANS & TEXAS PAC. R. CO. et al.

Nos. 544, 545.

Supreme Court of the United States

January 18, 1965

1

Donald Macleay, Richard M. Freeman, John C. Lovett, Byron M. Gray, Nuel D. Belnap, A. Alvis Layne, Charles J. McCarthy and Robert H. Marquis, for Arrow Transportation Co. and others.

2

Robert W. Ginnane, I.K. Hay and Betty Jo Christian, for the Interstate Commerce Commission.

3

Dean Acheson, Henry P. Sailer and W. Graham Claytor, Jr., for Southern Railway System Companies.

4

John F. Donelan and John M. Clearly, for Southern Governors Conference and others.

5

Elbert R. Leigh, for Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. and others.

6

William A. McClain and Edgar T. Bellinger, for City of Cincinnati.

7

Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Orrick and Lionel Kestenbaum, for the United States.

8

Neil Brooks, for the Secretary of Agriculture.

9

PER CURIAM. These appeals are from a single judgment of a three-judge District Court, 229 F.Supp. 572, which set aside and permanently enjoined the operation, enforcement and execution of the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 321 I.C.C. 582, canceling certain rate reductions which had been put into effect by the appellee railroads on the grounds that the new lower rates violated §§ 1(5) and 3(1) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1(5), 3(1) (1958 ed.). The judgment of the District Court is vacated and the case is remanded to the District Court with instructions to enter an order remanding the case to the Interstate Commerce Commission for reconsideration by the Commission in light of the District Court's determinations (1) that the Commission's conclusion that § 3(1) was violated was not supported by adequate findings and (2) that the Commission's conclusion that § (5) was violated was based, at least in part, on its prior conclusion that there was a violation of § 3(1). See FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17, 20, 73 S.Ct. 85, 97 L.Ed. 15.

10

Mr. Justice BLACK, Mr. Justice STEWART, and Mr. Justice WHITE would note probable jurisdiction of these appeals and set them for argument on the merits.