850
issued under authority granted by the 'charter might· be erroneous, that is sufficient. yet, if the special act l\Iuthorized the issuing of The question is, did power exist? Whether the sot,nce thereof was correctly pointed out can make no difference, Bqt it is said that the provisions of the specm,l act define who shall vote, and that these have not been complied with. The answer is that the tribunal, .the county court, was by law made the judge of such matters, and When they issued the bonds innocent holderlJ had a right to presume ,that all preliminary requirements had been complied with. The objections urged against the validity of the bonds are not that there was no power to issue them, but that no'power existed under the eharter, because the speoial act limits the power there granted. : The defendant county urging this objection can only.do soon the &sBumption that the special act is in force. If so, there existed· power to,issue the bonds; and the same having -been issued, the law will attribJlte the exercise of the authority to thettue souroe in the furtheranee ,of justice and good faith. Eight years of interest have been paid 'On these bonds,' thus affirming their validity and ouring itl'egularities, so far 8S such acts tend in that direction. The law Of the case arising lipon the facts is with the plaintiff, and judgment Q,()cordingly.
L4WRENCE, Jr" and another?!. MORRISANU (Ctrcuie Court, E. D. New
·. Ii
York.
July 19,1882.)\.
1,: CONTRACT BY LE'fTEll- ACCEPTANCE OF PROPOSITION -- ORAL MERGED. . , _ ,
Where libellants made an offer by the respondents to alter and repair one of its steam-boats and "to build: out the frameB we have talked of," which offer was accepted by letter on the part,of the rtlspoUclerits,'such letters constituted a wtitten contract, and all prio(' cpnversations aq.d statements were merged in it. , . . . . . . , '.'
.
2. SAME-STATEMENTS liOT GUARANTms.
Statements made in advance of the acqeptanceof a proposition;by1lltter, of what it was thought would be the result of a given' plan. are not guaranties of of such result. ,_. 3, SAME-PAYMENT-TAKlNG NOTE, EFFECT <iF·. '
Where, hythe written contract, payment was to;be made in f,t,el equivalent ,,'the taking of a note for,the'balance dllc on the perform!ltl,lce of the contract, isnot a waiver of the right to sue for the balance' dUE)';' such taRing of the note opera.tcs merely as a giV!ing of credit. ". ; ; .. '. ..' .
LAWRENCEV. MOaSISANIA STEAM-BOAT CO.
851
G. A. Black, for libellants. T. C. Cronin, for respondent. BLATCHFORD, Justice. The contract of the parties, as contained in the two letters, contained no warranty by the libellants that the alterations to be made would remedy the defects. The entire. contract is cOl1tained in those two letters. All prior conversations and statements and negotiations were merged in the written contract. The expression "to build out the frames as we have talked of" can refer only to the conversation between Longstreet and the libellants. Longstreet testifies that the libellants did what they agreed should be done. They built out the frames to the extent that they and Longstreet thought necessary. They and Longstreet were disappointed in the result. Besides, the new test,irnony in this court shows that the letter of the libellants to Longstreet was brought before the board; that Longstreet was called. in, and stated the proposed method of alteration, and what it was thought its effect would be; and tha.nhen the board atrlhQ1\iZedMr. White to accept the proposition of the-libellants. Stating in advance what it is thought will be the result of a given plan and guarantying such result are two different things. The'libellants carefully avoided making any such special contract as is'set tlp'in the answer. There was never any waiver of any righUo bring this suit. By the written contract the payment was to be made in "cash or 'its equivalent." Taking the note was no such waiver. Tlie non-payment of the note remitted the libellants to all. their rights, and caused. the taking of the note to operate merely as a giving of credit. ' If the respondent desires, the decree may direct the sutrender of the note. The libellants araentitled, to a decree. for $1,204.88, with interest at 6 percent. per annum from Novemher '90, 1880, and their costs in the district oourt, taxed at $103.36, and their costs in this court, to be taxed. l3eesame parti,es.9 FED. REP. 208.
. .i.
UNITED STATES
v.
TRAIN
and others. July 26. 1882.)
(Circuit Uourt, 1.
n. Massachusetts.
PRACTICE AND PnOCEDURE-OECTION
914, REV. ST:, 6ection 914 of the Revised Statutes, providing that the practice and procedure in the United States courts shall conform as near as may be to the practice'and procedure existing at the time in like causes in the courts of record of the state within which such courts are held, does not extend to the means of enforcing or revising a decision once made.
2.
SAME-PROCEEDINGS AFTER TRIAL.
The object of this section was to assimilate the form and manner of presenting claims and defences in the preparation for and trial of suits to those prestate courts, and does not include statutes requiring instructions vailing in to bem writing, or permitting instructions and certain papers to be taken by the jury when they retire, or requiring the jury to be directed to find specially upon pitrticu,ar questions ofIfact, nor to the,manner or time of taking a case from one federal court to another by: writ ofer;ror, bill of exceptions, or appeal. I' ,
P. CummingB and Geo. P. Sanger, fat the United States-. 'J. O. Teele, for defendant. :J Before GRAY and LOWELL, JJ. GRA1', ,Justice. This is' a motion to dismiss a writ of error sued out of the United States to reverse a judgment of the district court in favor of the defendants in error in an action at law brought them as sureties on the bond of a paymaster in·the naYy. The case was tried.in the district court at, October term, 1880. The of January, verdict for the defendants was returned on ,the 1881, the ended on the fourteenth of March, 1881, and the case was continued to the next term, at which, onj the ninth of April,a .billof: exceptions was :filed by the United States, which the parties, hy;stipulatrondn writing"agreedshb.uldhave the same force and effect as if it had been filed on the last day of the term at which the verdict judge was rendered, and which was aferwards allowed by the 'the jury and ordered to be filed as of the date of the verdict left the bar. The ground of the motion to dismiss is that the bill of exceptions was not filed within three days after the verdict, or within such further time, not exceeding five days, unless by consent of the adverse party, as the judge might allow, in accordance with the rule prescribed by the statutes of Massachusetts in the case of exceptions to the rule ings of a judge of the supreme judicial court, or of the superior court. Mass. Gen. St. c. 115, § 7; Mass. Pub. St. c. 153, § 8; Cum. v. Greenlaw, 119 Mass. 208.